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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
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 The Appellants, political groups in Pennsylvania and 
several of their supporters, have invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to 
challenge the constitutionality of two provisions of 
Pennsylvania’s election code that regulate ballot access, 
namely title 25, sections 2911(b) and 2937 of Pennsylvania’s 
Consolidated Statutes.  Section 2911(b) and a similar section, 
§ 2872.2(a), require that candidates seeking to be included on 
the general election ballot – other than Republicans and 
Democrats – must submit nomination papers with a specified 
number of signatures.  Section 2937 allows private actors to 
object to such nomination papers and have them nullified, and 
it further permits a Pennsylvania court, as that court deems 
“just,” to impose administrative and litigation costs on a 
candidate if that candidate’s papers are so rejected.  The 
Appellants contest an order of the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissing their 
Complaint for lack of standing.  We conclude that they do 
have standing to pursue their constitutional claims, and we 
will therefore reverse.  
 
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
1
 
 
The Appellants are the Constitution Party of 
Pennsylvania (“Constitution Party”), the Green Party of 
Pennsylvania (“Green Party”), and the Libertarian Party of 
Pennsylvania (“Libertarian Party”) (collectively, the “C.G.L. 
Parties”); their respective chairmen – Joe Murphy, Carl 
Romanelli, and Thomas Robert Stevens; James Clymer, a 
                                              
1
 In accordance with our standard of review, see infra 
note 12, we set forth the facts in the light most favorable to 
the Appellants. 
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member of the Constitution Party; and Ken Krawchuk, a 
former candidate of the Libertarian Party.  For ease of 
reference we will refer to the Appellants collectively as 
the“Aspiring Parties.”2  They filed the instant suit against the 
Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Carol 
Aichele; the Commissioner of the Pennsylvania Bureau of 
Commissions, Elections, and Legislation, Jonathan M. Marks; 
and the Pennsylvania Attorney General (collectively, the 
“Commonwealth”) in their official capacities only.3     
                                              
2
 Finding a shorthand term for the Appellants has been 
a challenge.  “Minor political parties” is a statutorily defined 
term in Pennsylvania.  25 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2872.2(a).  
Despite referring to themselves as the “Minor Parties,” the 
organizational Appellants are in fact not minor parties but are 
“political bodies” for purposes of the election code because, 
as more fully explained herein, they did not attain a statutory 
threshold of votes in the 2010 election.  The term “party” also 
has an equivocal character, indicating both a political party 
and a litigant in a lawsuit.  Thus, we have created our own 
term.  We use it only to capture the idea that both the 
individual Appellants and the organizational Appellants 
aspire to full political participation. 
3
 When the Complaint was filed, the Attorney General 
was Linda L. Kelly.  The current Attorney General is 
Kathleen G. Kane.  The Commonwealth argues that the 
Attorney General should not have been named as a defendant 
because she “does not have a discrete role in administering 
the Pennsylvania Election Code.”  (Appellees’ Br. at 33.)  We 
agree.  The Aspiring Parties’ Complaint only asserts that the 
Attorney General is the “chief legal and law enforcement 
officer” of Pennsylvania, and it makes no allegations 
regarding her role in the electoral process.  (J.A. at 35.)  
 5 
 
 
To understand the parties’ dispute, a brief sketch of the 
statutory background is necessary. 
 
A. Pennsylvania’s Electoral Scheme 
 
Pennsylvania’s election code distinguishes between 
“political parties” and “political bodies.”  25 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 2831.  An organization qualifies as a “political party” if one 
of its candidates polled at least two percent of the largest 
entire vote cast in each of at least ten counties and “polled a 
total vote in the State equal to at least two per centum of the 
largest entire vote cast in the State for any elected candidate.”  
Id. § 2831(a).  Political parties may in turn be categorized as 
either major or minor parties, depending on their statewide 
voter registration.  Id. §2872.2(a); Rogers v. Corbett, 468 
F.3d 188, 190-91 (3d Cir. 2006).  Major parties are defined by 
exclusion as those that are not minor political parties under 
the election code, and minor parties are defined as those 
whose statewide registration is less than fifteen percent of the 
total statewide registration for all political parties.  25 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 2872.2(a).  At present, there are only two major 
parties in Pennsylvania, the Democratic Party and the 
Republican Party, as has been the case since the election code 
was enacted more than three-quarters of a century ago.  
“Political bodies” are organizations that did not have a 
candidate who crossed the two-percent threshold in the last 
election, and so they do not qualify for the benefits of being a 
minor party, let alone a major one.  Id. § 2831(a).   
                                                                                                     
Accordingly, we will direct that, on remand, all claims 
against the Attorney General be dismissed. 
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One of the most basic goals of a political organization, 
and the one for which the Aspiring Parties are contending in 
this case, is to have its candidates listed on the general 
election ballot.  Major parties get to place their candidates on 
the general election ballot through a publicly-funded primary 
process.
4
  See id. § 2862.  Minor parties and political bodies 
(which we will sometimes refer to together as “non-major 
parties”) have to go through a signature-gathering campaign 
to have their nominees appear on the general election ballot, 
but minor parties are at least able to access benefits under the 
election code “with respect to special elections, voter 
registration forms, [and] substituted nominations,” id. 
§ 2872.2.  Ultimately, the distinction between minor parties 
and political bodies is of less consequence in this case than is 
the distinction between major parties and non-major parties, 
since all non-major parties face essentially the same fight to 
get their candidates on the ballot through the submission of 
nominating papers.  It is the rules governing that process that 
are the focus of the Aspiring Parties’ Complaint. 
 
                                              
4
 To appear on the primary ballot, candidates from 
major parties must submit a certain number of valid 
signatures depending on the office sought.  25 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 2872.1.  The largest number of signatures required for 
primary ballot access is 2,000 for candidates seeking offices 
such as President of the United States and Governor of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  Id.  The winner of the 
primary election automatically appears on the general election 
ballot as the candidate of his or her respective major party.  
Id. § 2882. 
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To appear on the general election ballot, minor parties 
and political bodies are required to file nomination papers 
with the Secretary of the Commonwealth.
5
  See id. §§ 2872.2 
(“Nominations by minor political parties”), 2911 
(“Nominations by political bodies”); Rogers, 468 F.3d at 191.  
Successful nomination papers for a statewide office must 
include valid signatures equal to two percent of the vote total 
of the candidate with the highest number of votes for any 
state-wide office in the previous election.  25 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 2911(b).
6
  After being filed, the nomination papers are 
                                              
5
 Although the Aspiring Parties refer to “nominating 
petitions,” we will use the statutory term “nomination papers” 
found in § 2911.  Under the election code, major party 
candidates file “nomination petitions” to appear on the 
primary ballot.  25 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2872.1.  However, 
candidates of minor political parties and political bodies file 
“nomination papers” to appear on the general election ballot.  
Id. §§ 2911(b), 2872.2.  Although the terms are sometimes 
used interchangeably, as in certain quotes from the briefings 
and declarations before us, we will adhere to the statutory 
distinction as much as possible.      
6
 25 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2911(b) provides in relevant part: 
 
Where the nomination is for any office to be 
filled by the electors of the State at large, the 
number of qualified electors of the State signing 
such nomination paper shall be at least equal to 
two per centum of the largest entire vote cast 
for any elected candidate in the State at large at 
the last preceding election at which State-wide 
candidates were voted for. 
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examined by the Secretary of the Commonwealth, who must 
reject the filing of any submission that “contains material 
errors or defects apparent on [its] face … or on the face of the 
appended or accompanying affidavits; or … contains material 
alterations made after signing without the consent of the 
signers; or … does not contain a sufficient number of 
signatures as required by law.”  Id. § 2936.   
 
Even after being accepted by the Secretary, however, 
the papers can be subjected to further examination if a private 
party files an objection.
7
  In particular, the election code 
provides in § 2937 that 
 
[a]ll nomination petitions and papers received 
and filed … shall be deemed to be valid, unless, 
within seven days after the last day for filing 
said nomination petition or paper, a petition is 
presented to the court specifically setting forth 
                                                                                                     
 
25 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2911(b).  The non-major party candidates 
have approximately five months to circulate nomination 
papers from before the state-run primary to August 1 of the 
election year.  Rogers, 468 F.3d at 191.  
 
7
 This process also applies to the nomination petitions 
filed by major political parties to be placed on the primary 
ballot.  25 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 2936, 2937.  The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has held that despite using the word 
“petition,” § 2937 applies to both nomination petitions and 
nomination papers.  In re Nader, 905 A.2d 450, 458 (Pa. 
2006). 
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the objections thereto, and praying that the said 
petition or paper be set aside.   
 
Id. § 2937.  If any objections are filed pursuant to § 2937, the 
Commonwealth Court reviews and holds a hearing on the 
objections and determines whether the candidate’s name will 
be placed on the ballot.
8
  Id.  Of special importance to the 
                                              
8
 Section 2937 provides for the full process by which a 
nomination petition or nomination paper is challenged:  
 
A copy of said petition shall, within said period, 
be served on the officer or board with whom 
said nomination petition or paper was filed. 
Upon the presentation of such a petition, the 
court shall make an order fixing a time for 
hearing which shall not be later than ten days 
after the last day for filing said nomination 
petition or paper, and specifying the time and 
manner of notice that shall be given to the 
candidate or candidates named in the 
nomination petition or paper sought to be set 
aside. On the day fixed for said hearing, the 
court shall proceed without delay to hear said 
objections, and shall give such hearing 
precedence over other business before it, and 
shall finally determine said matter not later than 
fifteen (15) days after the last day for filing said 
nomination petitions or papers. If the court shall 
find that said nomination petition or paper is 
defective under the provisions of section 976,
 
or 
does not contain a sufficient number of genuine 
signatures of electors entitled to sign the same 
 10 
 
present dispute is that, when an objection is successful and a 
nomination petition or paper is dismissed, “the court shall 
make such order as to the payment of the costs of the 
proceedings, including witness fees, as it shall deem just.”  Id.  
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that, under § 2937, 
“an award of costs … is not warranted solely on the basis that 
the party prevailed”; there must be some further reason, and it 
is an abuse of discretion for a lower court to award such costs 
“without identifying any reason specific to [the] case or … 
why justice would demand shifting costs to them.”  In re 
Farnese, 17 A.3d 357, 369-70 (Pa. 2011).  At the same time, 
however, the court held that, while “fraud, bad faith, or gross 
misconduct … may require an award of costs,” “a party’s 
conduct need not proceed to such an extreme before” costs 
can be shifted.  Id. at 372.  Thus, under § 2937, costs may be 
awarded to the person opposing nomination papers if there is 
some showing that it would be “just” to do so, despite there 
                                                                                                     
under the provisions of this act, or was not filed 
by persons entitled to file the same, it shall be 
set aside. If the objections relate to material 
errors or defects apparent on the face of the 
nomination petition or paper, the court, after 
hearing, may, in its discretion, permit 
amendments within such time and upon such 
terms as to payment of costs, as the said court 
may specify.  In case any such petition is 
dismissed, the court shall make such order as to 
the payment of the costs of the proceedings, 
including witness fees, as it shall deem just. 
 
25 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2937 (footnote omitted). 
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being no “fraud, bad faith, or gross misconduct” on the part of 
the candidate whose papers were challenged.
9
  Id.   
 
Finally, a political organization may also lose its status 
as a political party.  If it does not meet the two percent 
threshold, it descends again to the status of political body.  
See 25 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2831(a).  Therefore, if a political 
party fielded no candidate in a general election or if its 
candidates received support from less than two percent of the 
highest vote-getter, it would qualify only as a political body 
in the following election.  Id. 
 
Sections 2911 and 2937 became law in 1937.  Section 
2911 was amended in 1971 to increase the percentage of 
signatures required, see People’s Party v. Tucker, 347 F. 
Supp. 1, 2 & n.2 (M.D. Pa. 1972), and § 2937 was, in 2011, 
the subject of an important interpretive opinion by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, In re Farnese, 17 A.3d at 359.  
The Aspiring Parties have extensive experience with these 
statutes, having collected signatures, defended nomination 
papers, and been placed on and struck from election ballots at 
various times in the past decade. 
 
B. Recent Elections 
                                              
9
 In In re Nader, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
determined that the language of § 2937 “discusses both 
nomination petitions and petitions to set aside a nomination 
petition.  Thus, the court can impose costs, as justice requires, 
when either the nominating petition is set aside or the petition 
to set aside the nomination petition is dismissed.”  In re 
Nader, 905 A.2d at 458 (quoting In re Lee, 578 A. 2d 1277, 
1279 n.3 (1990)). 
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In the 2002, 2004, and 2006 elections, the C.G.L. 
Parties were each “qualified minor parties … because each 
party had a candidate on the preceding general election ballot 
who polled the requisite number of votes.”  (Appellants’ 
Opening Br. at 9.)  In 2004, however, independent 
presidential candidate Ralph Nader and his running mate 
were ordered to pay $81,102.19 in costs under § 2937, 
following a court determination that their Pennsylvania 
“signature-gathering campaign involved fraud and deception 
of massive proportions.”  In re Nader, 905 A.2d 450, 460 (Pa. 
2006).  That ruling appears to mark the first time costs were 
ever imposed pursuant to § 2937, and the reverberations from 
that decision have been significant.  
 
According to the Aspiring Parties, the Nader decision 
worked a transformation in how § 2937 is understood and 
applied.  The threat of extraordinary costs like those involved 
in Nader “caused several minor party candidates either to 
withhold or withdraw their nomination petitions” during the 
2006 election cycle.  (J.A. at 39.)  For example, in a 
declaration filed in this case, Appellant Krawchuk stated that, 
although the Libertarian Party nominated him as its candidate 
for United States Senate in 2006, he declined to run “due to 
the fact that … Ralph Nader and his running mate … had 
recently been ordered to pay $81,102.19.”  (Id. at 90-91.)  
Similarly, Christina Valente, the Green Party’s nominee for 
Lieutenant Governor in 2006, stated in her declaration that, 
“after a challenge was filed against me …[,] I withdrew from 
the race.  My decision to withdraw was based entirely on the 
fact that I was unwilling to assume the risk of incurring 
litigation costs pursuant to 25 P.S. § 2937.”  (Id. at 78.)   
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Thus in 2006, “only one minor party candidate [ran] 
for statewide office,” Appellant Romanelli, the Green Party’s 
nominee for United States Senate.  (J.A. at 39)  Based on the 
votes cast in the 2004 general election, Romanelli had to 
obtain 67,070 valid signatures to get on the ballot in 2006.  
He submitted 93,829 signatures but was removed from the 
ballot following a successful objection filed pursuant to § 
2937 by private parties affiliated with the Democratic Party.  
Romanelli was ordered to pay costs totaling $80,407.56.  In 
re Rogers, 942 A.2d 915, 930 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008).  The 
Commonwealth Court found that costs were warranted due to 
the failure of Romanelli’s campaign and the Green Party to 
comply with certain court orders, including an order to 
provide nine people to assist in the review of the nominating 
signatures
10
 and an order to timely provide the court with the 
                                              
10
 The review of the Romanelli signatures was 
facilitated by the Statewide Uniform Registry of Electors 
(“SURE”) computer system.  The Commonwealth Court 
ordered that  
[e]ach party shall have present at that time at 
least nine individuals, in addition to counsel, 
who are capable of performing computer 
searches. These individuals will be given a short 
training session by Department personnel on 
how to perform SURE system searches.  With 
the assistance of court personnel, the designated 
individuals of each party shall commence a 
review of the challenged signatures and shall 
tabulate, with the assistance of counsel, the 
numbers of challenged signatures found to be 
valid and those found to be invalid.  
 14 
 
“specifics of what stipulated invalid signatures [Romanelli] 
believed could be rehabilitated.”  Id. at 929.   
 
 Therefore, because of candidates withdrawing their 
nomination papers and the successful challenge to 
Romanelli’s nomination papers, the C.G.L Parties fielded no 
candidates for statewide office in the 2006 election.  That 
meant that, under 25 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2831(a), none of the 
C.G.L. Parties qualified as minor parties leading up to the 
2008 election.  They became, instead, political bodies. 
 
In the 2008 election, while the Libertarian Party was 
able to collect the requisite number of signatures – and those 
signatures went unchallenged – and to place candidates on the 
general election ballot, the Constitution and Green Parties 
were again unable to get any candidates on the ballot.  The 
chairman of the Constitution Party stated in his declaration 
that, following the 2006 election, his party could not recruit 
any candidates “willing to submit nomination petitions and 
thereby risk incurring litigation costs pursuant to 25 P.S. 
§ 2937.”  (J.A. at 53.)  Supporters of that party were also 
unwilling to donate time and resources to electioneering.  
Likewise, the chairwoman of the Green Party in 2008 and 
2010 stated that her party was unable to regain minor-party 
status because of the effect that § 2937 challenges and costs 
had on member morale.  She declared that, as Statewide 
Petition Coordinator for 2012, she “continue[d] to encounter 
serious difficulty in recruiting petitioners,” many of whom 
                                                                                                     
 
In re Rogers, 942 A.2d 915, 920 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008). 
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refused to participate in nomination drives because they 
believe that § 2937 “renders petitioning futile.”  (Id. at 63.) 
 
 In 2010, the C.G.L. Parties again resumed the 
nomination signature gathering process.  The Democratic and 
Republican parties or their “allies” were allegedly behind 
objections to the nomination papers of the Green and 
Libertarian Parties.  (Id. at 41.)  The Aspiring Parties point to 
a challenge to the Libertarian Party’s nomination papers as an 
example of the kinds of threats of financial ruin used by the 
major parties to shut down competing political activity.  The 
former chair of the Libertarian Party asserts that his party had 
submitted “more than the 19,056 valid signatures required” 
under § 2911(b) for its candidates for Governor, Lieutenant 
Governor, and United States Senator but that the party 
“withdrew the petitions after three Republican voters, aided 
by the Pennsylvania Republican Party, challenged them.”  (Id. 
at 83 (declaration of then-party chair Michael Robertson).)  
An email from the challengers’ attorney, quoted in the 
Aspiring Parties’ Complaint, was hardly subtle:  
 
Following up on our conversation earlier this 
morning, I do not have exact figures on what 
our costs would be if this signature count 
continues and my clients are required to 
complete the review and/or move forward with 
a hearing.  However, a rough estimate would be 
$92,255 to $106,455 … .  These costs are 
comparable to the costs awarded in recent years 
by the Commonwealth Court in similar 
nomination paper challenges … . Please let me 
know if you need any further information in 
order to discuss with your clients a withdrawal 
 16 
 
of their candidacy… . As I stated, the sooner 
that your clients agree to withdraw the more 
likely my clients will agree to not pursue 
recovery of all their costs incurred in pursuing 
this matter.   
 
(Id. at 87.)   
 
The Libertarian Party candidates responded by 
withdrawing their nomination papers because “they were 
unable to assume the risk of incurring the costs,” and the 
party “lacked the financial resources to indemnify them.”  (Id. 
at 84.)  Accordingly, no Libertarian Party candidate appeared 
on the 2010 ballot.   
 
The Green Party’s 2010 United States Senate 
candidate, Melvin Packer, likewise withdrew his nomination 
papers following a challenge from Democratic senate 
candidate Joe Sestak because, Packer said, he “could not 
afford to have costs assessed against [him] pursuant to 
Section 2937.”  (Id. at 73.)  The Constitution Party’s nominee 
for Governor, John Krupa, “refused to submit [his] 
Nominating Papers” and “thereby risk incurring litigation 
costs pursuant to … § 2937.”  (Id. at 56.)  As in 2006, “no 
candidate for statewide office, except the Republican and 
Democrat, appeared on Pennsylvania’s 2010 general election 
ballot.”11  (Id. at 43.)   
 
                                              
11
 The events of the 2012 election cycle are intertwined 
with the procedural history of this case and are accordingly 
addressed in the portion of the opinion dealing with that 
history.  See infra Part I.D. 
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 C.   Allegations Regarding Future Elections 
 
The Aspiring Parties’ Complaint and the 
accompanying declarations also contain allegations about the 
anticipated impact of Pennsylvania’s electoral scheme on 
future elections.  Those allegations include, but are not 
limited to, the following. 
 
Appellant Krawchuk, the Libertarian Party nominee 
for United States Senate in 2006, declared that he would “no 
longer run for statewide office … as long as [he] must assume 
the risk of incurring costs pursuant to Section 2937.”  (J.A. at 
91.)  Despite being asked by party members, Krawchuk 
refused to run as the party’s nominee in 2014 because § 2937 
remains in effect.
 
  
 
Likewise, Kat Valleley, who was the Libertarian 
Party’s 2010 nominee for Lieutenant Governor but withdrew 
her candidacy after an objection was filed, declared that 
“[she] will no longer run for office as a nominee of [the 
Libertarian Party], as long as [she] must assume the risk of 
incurring costs pursuant to Section 2937.”  (Id. at 97.)   
 
In addition, the Aspiring Parties allege that candidates 
are not the only ones affected.  Bob Small, Co-Chair of the 
Green Party’s Delaware County Chapter and a nomination 
drive participant in 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010, stated that he 
would not participate in any future petition drives as long as 
the party’s candidates face the threat of litigation.   
 
 D.   Procedural History 
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 The Aspiring Parties brought this action on May 17, 
2012, in the middle of signature drives to place C.G.L. Party 
candidates on the 2012 general election ballot.  They allege in 
their Complaint that “Pennsylvania’s ballot access scheme 
violated rights guaranteed to them by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution, by forcing 
them to assume the risk of incurring substantial financial 
burdens if they defend nomination petitions they are required 
by law to submit.”  (Id. at 31.)  Count I alleges that 
§§ 2911(b) and 2937 violate the Aspiring Parties’ “freedoms 
of speech, petition, assembly, and association for political 
purposes” under the First and Fourteenth Amendments by 
imposing substantial financial burdens on them to defend 
their nomination papers.  (Id. at 46-47.)  Count II alleges that 
§§ 2911(b) and 2937 violate the Aspiring Parties’ right to 
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment by 
requiring them to bear the costs of validating nomination 
papers, while Republican and Democratic Party candidates 
are placed on the general election ballots automatically and 
by means of publicly funded primary elections.  Count III 
alleges that § 2937 is unconstitutional on its face for 
authorizing the imposition of costs against candidates, even if 
they do not engage in misconduct, thereby chilling First 
Amendment rights to freedom of speech, petition, assembly, 
and association.  The Aspiring Parties seek a declaratory 
judgment in keeping with their allegations, as well as 
injunctive relief to prevent the Commonwealth “from 
enforcing the signature requirement imposed by 25 P.S. 
§ 2911(b).”  (Id. at 50.)  They attached 13 declarations to their 
Complaint and submitted an additional four declarations 
during the pendency of proceedings in the District Court. 
 
 19 
 
On August 1, 2012, the C.G.L. Parties each submitted 
nomination papers to the Secretary of the Commonwealth as 
required under the election code.  No objection was brought 
with respect to papers filed by the Green Party, but private 
individuals, who were eventually allowed to intervene as 
defendants in this case, challenged the nomination papers of 
the Constitution and Libertarian Parties.  In response to those 
challenges, the Aspiring Parties filed a Motion for a 
Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction in the 
District Court on the basis that the threat of costs would force 
them to withdraw the nomination papers if the challenges 
were allowed to proceed.     
 
 During the pendency of that motion, the Constitution 
Party withdrew from the election because, according to the 
Aspiring Parties, it was unable to comply with a state court 
order requiring that it provide 20 individuals to assist in the 
signature review process.  On October 10, 2012, the 
Commonwealth Court found that the Libertarian Party had 
presented a sufficient number of valid signatures and 
dismissed the objection to its nomination papers.   
 
The Commonwealth then filed a motion to dismiss this 
case under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  The District Court granted the motion and 
dismissed the Complaint for lack of standing under Rule 
12(b)(1).  It denied the preliminary injunction motion as 
moot.  This timely appeal followed.   
 
II. Discussion
12
 
                                              
12
 We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  Whether the District Court had jurisdiction is the 
 20 
 
 
 Article III of the United States Constitution limits the 
scope of federal judicial power to the adjudication of “cases” 
and “controversies.”  U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.  A fundamental 
safeguard of that limitation is the doctrine of standing.  See 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) 
(“[T]he core component of standing is an essential and 
unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of 
Article III.”).  Only a party with standing can invoke the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts.  At present, the only 
question for decision is whether the Aspiring Parties have 
standing – that is, do they even have the right to be heard.    
 
We emphasize at the outset that we are not prejudging 
the merits of the case.  We do not minimize the precedent 
supporting a state’s rational interest in preventing voter 
confusion, avoiding ballot clutter, and ensuring viable 
candidates by limiting ballot access.
 
 See Jenness v. Fortson, 
403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971) (upholding Georgia’s 5% signature 
requirement to appear on the general election ballot); Rogers, 
468 F.3d at 195 (upholding § 2911(b)’s 2% signature 
requirement to appear on the general election ballot as a 
                                                                                                     
issue before us.  We exercise plenary review over all 
jurisdictional questions, including those related to standing.  
Belitskus v. Pizzingrilli, 343 F.3d 632, 639 (3d Cir. 2003).  
Because we are dealing with a facial challenge to jurisdiction, 
as more fully described herein, “we must accept as true all 
material allegations set forth in the complaint, and must 
construe those facts in favor of the complaining party.”  
Storino v. Borough of Point Pleasant Beach, 322 F.3d 293, 
296 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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minor party or political body); cf. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 
U.S. 428, 441 (1992) (upholding Hawaii’s prohibition on 
write-in voting).  Nor do we discount the potential success of 
the Aspiring Parties’ First Amendment claims.  Cf. Anderson 
v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793 (1983) (“A burden that falls 
unequally on new or small political parties or on independent 
candidates impinges, by its very nature, on association 
choices protected by the First Amendment.”); Bullock v. 
Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149 (1972) (holding high filing fees 
collected to finance primary elections unconstitutional); 
Belitskus v. Pizzingrilli, 343 F.3d 632, 647 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(holding Pennsylvania’s mandatory filing fees 
unconstitutional as applied to indigent candidates).  It would 
be a sad irony indeed if the state that prides itself on being the 
cradle of American liberty had unlawfully restrictive ballot 
access laws.  But we are not now concerned with which side 
may win – a fact that makes much of the Commonwealth’s 
briefing beside the point.  (See, e.g., Appellees’ Br. at 23 
(“[T]he constitutionality of § 2911(b) is not open to debate … 
.”); id. at 40 (“[I]t is too late to question the validity of the 
statutory petition requirement.”); id. at 42 (“This Court … has 
already upheld § 2911(b), and Pennsylvania courts have 
already found § 2937 constitutional.”).)  The merits of the 
Aspiring Parties’ claims are not before us, and, with that in 
mind, we first consider the standard of review that the District 
Court should have applied in addressing the question of 
standing. 
 
A. Rule 12(b)(1) Standard 
 
The District Court dismissed the Aspiring Parties’ 
Complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  “A motion to dismiss for want of standing is ... 
 22 
 
properly brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), because standing 
is a jurisdictional matter.”  Ballentine v. United States, 486 
F.3d 806, 810 (3d Cir. 2007).  A district court has to first 
determine, however, whether a Rule 12(b)(1) motion presents 
a “facial” attack or a “factual” attack on the claim at issue, 
because that distinction determines how the pleading must be 
reviewed.  In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron, 678 F.3d 235, 
243 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)).  
 
A facial attack, as the adjective indicates, is an 
argument that considers a claim on its face and asserts that it 
is insufficient to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
court because, for example, it does not present a question of 
federal law, or because there is no indication of a diversity of 
citizenship among the parties, or because some other 
jurisdictional defect is present.  Such an attack can occur 
before the moving party has filed an answer or otherwise 
contested the factual allegations of the complaint.  See 
Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 889-92 (noting the distinction 
between a facial attack and a “factual evaluation,” which 
“may occur at any stage of the proceedings, from the time the 
answer has been served until after the trial has been 
completed.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).  A factual 
attack, on the other hand, is an argument that there is no 
subject matter jurisdiction because the facts of the case – and 
here the District Court may look beyond the pleadings to 
ascertain the facts – do not support the asserted jurisdiction.  
So, for example, while diversity of citizenship might have 
been adequately pleaded by the plaintiff, the defendant can 
submit proof that, in fact, diversity is lacking.  See id. at 891 
(“[T]he trial court is free to weigh the evidence … and the 
existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial 
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court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional 
claims.”).  In sum, a facial attack “contests the sufficiency of 
the pleadings,” In re Schering Plough Corp., 678 F.3d at 243, 
“whereas a factual attack concerns the actual failure of a 
[plaintiff’s] claims to comport [factually] with the 
jurisdictional prerequisites.”  CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 
132, 139 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(alterations in original).   
 
In reviewing a facial attack, “the court must only 
consider the allegations of the complaint and documents 
referenced therein and attached thereto, in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff.”  In re Schering Plough Corp., 678 
F.3d at 243 (quoting Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 
F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Thus, a facial attack calls for a district court to 
apply the same standard of review it would use in considering 
a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), i.e., construing the 
alleged facts in favor of the nonmoving party.  Id.  This is in 
marked contrast to the standard of review applicable to a 
factual attack, in which a court may weigh and “consider 
evidence outside the pleadings.”  Gould Elecs. Inc., 220 F.3d 
at 176 (citing Gotha v. United States, 115 F.3d 176, 178-79 
(3d Cir. 1997)). 
 
The District Court here construed the Aspiring Parties’ 
motion to dismiss as a “factual attack” and said that, “to the 
extent that certain of the plaintiffs’ jurisdictional allegations 
are challenged on the facts, those claims receive no 
presumption of truthfulness.”  Constitution Party v. Aichele, 
No. 12-2726, 2013 WL 867183, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 
2013).  That was error.  The Commonwealth filed the attack 
before it filed any answer to the Complaint or otherwise 
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presented competing facts.  Its motion was therefore, by 
definition, a facial attack.  Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 892 n.17 
(“A factual jurisdictional proceeding cannot occur until 
plaintiff’s allegations have been controverted.”).  A factual 
attack requires a factual dispute, and there is none here.  See 
Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Nw. 
Airlines, Inc., 673 F.2d 700, 711 (3d Cir. 1982)  
(“[Defendant’s] motion was supported by a sworn statement 
of facts.  It therefore must be construed as a factual, rather 
than a facial attack … .”).  As the Commonwealth itself said 
in its Answering Brief on appeal, “the actual facts of this case 
were not contested in any real sense.”  (Appellee’s Br. at 27.)  
The motion was thus a facial attack on subject matter 
jurisdiction, and the Aspiring Parties were entitled to the 
more generous standard of review associated with such an 
attack.  Cf. Askew v. Church of the Lord Jesus Christ, 684 
F.3d 413, 417 (3d Cir. 2012) (“As the defendants had not 
answered and the parties had not engaged in discovery, the 
first motion to dismiss was facial.”); Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 
891 (“The facial attack does offer … safeguards to the 
plaintiff: the court must consider the allegations of the 
complaint as true.”).  The Commonwealth conceded the 
District Court’s error in this regard, stating at oral argument 
that the motion to dismiss “was made initially as a facial 
attack.”  Oral Arg. Tr. at 36:14-15. 
 
Nevertheless, the Commonwealth argues that the 
District Court’s error was merely one of terminology and was 
harmless.
13
  The Aspiring Parties point out obvious problems 
                                              
13
 The Commonwealth also argues that, “[b]y filing 
their motion for injunctive relief, the [C.G.L. Parties] 
themselves caused this case to advance beyond the pleading 
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with that assertion.  They rightly note that the District Court 
rejected some facts as “conjectural or hypothetical” and 
declared that it was “not persuaded” by certain allegations,  
Constitution Party, 2013 WL 867183, at *7, none of which 
could have occurred if the Court had accepted the allegations 
in the Complaint and the supporting declarations as true.
14
  
For instance, the Court stated that, “[a]lthough the plaintiffs 
blame their recruitment difficulties on the possibility of being 
assessed fees and costs, they provide nothing more than 
conjecture and conclusory assertions as support.”  Id. at *8.  
But that is simply not so.  The Aspiring Parties provided 13 
declarations, which, taken as true, establish that candidates 
from the C.G.L. Parties have not run for office precisely 
because of the threat that, under § 2937, they would be 
saddled with the high costs of litigating over nomination 
papers that must be submitted under § 2911(b).  For example, 
                                                                                                     
stage” such that “the district court was entitled to take … 
additional information … into account in its standing 
analysis” and might have been justified in viewing the 
challenge to jurisdiction as a factual rather than facial attack.  
(Appellees’ Br. at 26.)  That reasoning is at odds with the 
Commonwealth’s concession that the facts are not disputed.  
The Aspiring Parties’ argument is that the District Court did 
not credit their factual allegations or the additional 
information in their declarations.  That argument remains 
unrebutted. 
 
14
 The Commonwealth is correct, however, that the 
District Court, while required to accept “factual assertions … 
[that] plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief,” is not 
required to accept “bare assertions,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 681 (2009), or legal conclusions.  Id. at 678.    
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Krawchuk, though he had been a candidate before, expressly 
declared that he would “no longer run for statewide office … 
as long as [he] must assume the risk of incurring costs 
pursuant to Section 2937.”  (J.A. at 91.)   
 
Particularly telling is the District Court’s comment that 
it was “not persuaded” by the allegations that “future 
candidates will be assessed costs.”  Constitution Party, 2013 
WL 867183, at *7.  The words “not persuaded” betray a foray 
into fact-finding which, in the review of a facial attack on 
subject matter jurisdiction, the District Court was not entitled 
to undertake.  Moreover, the District Court misapprehended 
the Aspiring Parties’ argument.  It is not, as the Court viewed 
it, simply that future costs may be assessed, but rather that the 
threat of high costs has imposed, and will continue to impose, 
a real and chilling effect on political activity.  The Aspiring 
Parties allege and have adduced proof –uncontroverted at this 
stage – that Pennsylvania’s election scheme provoked, and 
will continue to provoke, costly major party challenges to the 
Aspiring Parties’ efforts to field candidates.15  The effects are 
not merely a matter of conjecture.  Despite attaining minor-
party status and a place on the ballot in 2008, all of the 
Libertarian Party candidates withdrew their 2010 nomination 
                                              
15
 The likelihood of future legal challenges is hardly 
farfetched.  The undisputed facts establish that the nomination 
papers of candidates representing one or more of the C.G.L. 
Parties have been challenged in all but one election cycle for 
the past decade.  Taking that history in the light most 
favorable to the Aspiring Parties sufficiently establishes, for 
purposes of overcoming a facial attack, that they would face 
similar obstacles in the future. 
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papers after receiving a direct threat from a lawyer 
representing challengers allied with a major party.   
 
The District Court did not review the Complaint in the 
light most favorable to the Aspiring Parties, and that resulted 
in an incorrect standing analysis.  The question remains, 
however, whether the Aspiring Parties’ allegations, if 
accepted, meet the legal requirements for standing.  As that 
calls for a purely legal analysis, we proceed with it now rather 
than remanding the question to the District Court.  See 
Chester ex rel. NLRB v. Grane Healthcare Co., 666 F.3d 87, 
100 (3d Cir. 2011) (declining to remand, despite the district 
court’s legal error, where the undisputed facts in the record 
allowed for a conclusive analysis under the correct legal 
standard).   
 
B. Standing 
 
 “The standing inquiry … focuse[s] on whether the 
party invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the 
outcome when the suit was filed.”  Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 
724, 734 (2008).  To establish that stake, a plaintiff must 
show three elements: injury-in-fact, causation, and 
redressability.  In the seminal standing opinion Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court described those 
elements as follows:   
 
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury 
in fact” – an invasion of a legally protected 
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, 
and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or 
‘hypothetical.’”  Second, there must be a causal 
connection between the injury and the conduct 
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complained of – the injury has to be “fairly ... 
trace[able] to the challenged action of the 
defendant, and not … th[e] result [of] the 
independent action of some third party not 
before the court.”  Third, it must be “likely,” as 
opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury 
will be “redressed by a favorable decision.” 
 
504 U.S. at 560-61 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).  
The same elements must be examined with respect to each 
individual claim advanced by the Aspiring Parties.  See In re 
Schering Plough Corp., 678 F.3d at 245 (“[A] plaintiff who 
raises multiple causes of action ‘must demonstrate standing 
for each claim he seeks to press.’” (quoting DaimlerChrysler 
Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006))).   
 
In its review of the Complaint, the District Court relied 
heavily on our unreported decision in Constitution Party of 
Pennsylvania. v. Cortes, 433 F. App’x 89 (3d Cir. 2011).16  In 
Cortes, the same political entities before us now, the C.G.L. 
Parties, filed a complaint in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania that challenged, 
among other things, the constitutionality of § 2937.
17
  Id. at 
                                              
16
 We are cognizant of our Internal Operating 
Procedure No. 5.7, which states that “by tradition [we] do[] 
not cite to [our] not precedential opinions as authority.”  Here 
we do not cite Constitution Party of Pennsylvania. v. Cortes, 
433 F. App’x 89 (3d Cir. 2011) because it serves as authority 
but because it is the foundation of the District Court’s 
opinion, and, as such, we must refer to it. 
 
17
 The plaintiffs in Cortes also challenged § 2872.2, 
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91. The district court dismissed the complaint on standing and 
ripeness grounds, and we affirmed on standing alone.  Id. at 
93.  While Cortes included a challenge to § 2937 by some of 
the same parties before us now, it is without precedential 
effect.  Even if it had precedential value, though, it presented 
quite different circumstances because the complaint in that 
case lacked the specificity and the supporting declarations 
present here, see id. at 93 (“[T]here is simply no allegation in 
the Amended Complaint, other than conclusory assertions … 
.”).  Despite that crucial difference, the District Court adopted 
the analysis from Cortes and held that the Aspiring Parties 
cannot be heard because they did not establish the injury and 
causation elements of standing.  Constitution Party, 2013 WL 
867183, at *8.  
The Aspiring Parties argue that the District Court 
erroneously dismissed their Complaint for lack of standing 
and that the dismissal “is tantamount to holding Section 
2911(b) and Section 2937 immune from judicial review.”  
(Appellants’ Opening Br. at 19.)  We agree. 
 
1. Injury-in-Fact  
 
When standing is contested, “the injury-in-fact element 
is often determinative.”  In re Schering Plough Corp., 678 
F.3d at 245 (quoting Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of Readington, 
555 F. 3d 131, 138 (3d Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  As earlier noted, injury-in-fact requires “an 
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete 
                                                                                                     
which deals with the nomination papers of minor political 
parties, not § 2911, which is challenged here and regulates the 
nomination process for political bodies.  433 F. App’x at 90. 
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and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural 
or hypothetical.”  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The injury 
“must ‘affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.’”  
In re Schering Plough Corp., 678 F.3d at 245 (quoting Lujan, 
504 U.S. at 560 n.1).  The Supreme Court has instructed that 
“the injury required for standing need not be actualized.  A 
party facing prospective injury has standing to sue where the 
threatened injury is real, immediate, and direct.”  Davis, 554 
U.S. at 734.  However, “[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct 
does not in itself show a present case or controversy 
regarding injunctive relief … if unaccompanied by any 
continuing, present adverse effects.”  City of L.A. v. Lyons, 
461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (second alteration in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted); cf. 
Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011) (“A 
plaintiff … lacks standing if his ‘injury’ stems from an 
indefinite risk of future harms inflicted by unknown third 
parties.”). 
The District Court determined that the Aspiring 
Parties’ alleged injury “could not be considered a real, 
immediate, and direct injury.”  Constitution Party, 2013 WL 
867183, at *7 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court 
downplayed their claims as being based on “the possibility of 
assessed costs,” and it characterized the threat of costs as 
merely “conjectural or hypothetical.”  Id.   Further, the Court 
stated that it was “not persuaded by the [Aspiring Parties’] 
arguments that because non-major party candidates have been 
assessed costs in the past, their future candidates will be 
assessed costs.”  Id.  It also concluded that the Aspiring 
Parties set forth no allegation that a Pennsylvania court would 
actually assess costs against a candidate who does not engage 
in misconduct.  Id. 
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In all of that, the District Court overlooked the 
Aspiring Parties’ allegations and evidence, as we have 
already described.  Moreover, it took no account of the 
principle that the factual support needed “to establish 
standing depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is 
himself an object of the action ... .  If he is, there is ordinarily 
little question that the action or inaction has caused him 
injury … .”  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561-62; see also Antonin 
Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of 
the Separation of Powers, 17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881, 894 
(1983) (“Thus, when an individual who is the very object of a 
law’s requirement or prohibition seeks to challenge it, he 
always has standing.”).  Here, the portions of the 
Pennsylvania election code challenged by the Aspiring Parties 
directly regulate the conduct of political bodies and their 
candidates.  25 Pa. Cons. Stat. §2911 (“Nominations by 
political bodies”); id. § 2937 (“Objections to nomination 
petitions and papers”).  Under § 2911(b), political bodies, i.e., 
organizations which, like the C.G.L. Parties, did not attain 
two percent of the vote received by the statewide candidate 
with the most votes in the prior election, are the explicit 
objects of the nomination-paper requirements.  The statute 
sets forth what such organizations must do to appear on the 
general election ballot.  Thus, to say that the Aspiring Parties 
are not objects of the scheme is untenable.  That is especially 
so since the Commonwealth’s merits arguments – which are 
broadly referenced throughout its briefing – plainly 
demonstrate that political bodies are indeed the target of 
§ 2911(b), which operates in conjunction with § 2937.
18
  The 
                                              
18
 As mentioned above, § 2872.2 establishes the 
nomination-paper mandate for minor political parties. It is 
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Commonwealth will contend on the merits, as it has in the 
past, that Pennsylvania has an interest in preventing minor 
political players from cluttering the ballot.  See Rogers, 468 
F.3d at 194 (“The state interests here are avoiding ballot 
clutter and ensuring viable candidates.”).  It is inconsistent to 
the point of whiplash to suggest that minor players like the 
Aspiring Parties are properly subject to the challenged 
provisions because there is a legitimate government interest 
in limiting their access to the ballot,  id., but then to contend 
in the standing context that those same provisions are not, in 
fact, aimed at the very same parties. 
 
In addition, the District Court gave little consideration 
to noteworthy developments in Pennsylvania law in the last 
ten years that affect our analysis here:  first, highly publicized 
awards of costs against would-be candidates; second, new 
case law allowing such costs to be awarded despite the good 
                                                                                                     
true that “both major party candidates seeking to appear on a 
primary election ballot, and minor party candidates seeking to 
appear on a November election ballot, are subject to § 2937.”  
(Appellee’s Letter filed March 19, 2014.)  That makes little 
practical difference, however, as political bodies, such as the 
Aspiring Parties, are the sole object of § 2911.  Nor does it 
matter under the language of Lujan if some few others are the 
statutory objects of § 2937, as long as the plaintiffs 
themselves are the object of the statute.  See Lujan, 504 U.S. 
at 561 (stating that the standing inquiry “depends 
considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of 
the action”).  And, we will not be so blind as to ignore the 
uncontested facts set forth in the Aspiring Parties’ 
declarations, which establish how § 2937 in practice has been 
applied only to non-major parties. 
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faith efforts of people facing challenges to nomination papers; 
and, third, repeated threats to pursue similar cost awards 
against the C.G.L. Parties’ candidates.   
 
As to the first point, it is no accident that this case 
arises now.  The Commonwealth itself highlights in its 
briefing the recent increase in litigation surrounding 
Pennsylvania’s election code, saying that “there are five 
appellate decisions, rendered between 2006 and 2011, that 
cannot be ignored.”  (Appellees’ Br. at 11.)  The Aspiring 
Parties are not ignoring them and neither will we.  It matters 
greatly how § 2937 has been applied in the last decade, a 
period in which that statute has been a vehicle for imposing 
significant litigation expenses on non-major parties and their 
candidates.  Cf. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 
__ (2014) (slip op., at 14) (finding injury-in-fact where there 
was a substantial “threat of future enforcement,” noting that, 
“[m]ost obviously, there is a history of past enforcement 
here”).  
 
 Next, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court only recently 
addressed the standard for deciding when to award costs 
under § 2937.  In In re Farnese, the court said that there are 
various “factors relevant to the discretionary assessment of 
whether to shift costs.”  17 A.3d at 372.  It looked at the 
statutory statement that when a nomination petition or paper 
is dismissed, the costs of the proceedings associated with the 
dismissal can be assessed against a candidate as is deemed 
just, and it interpreted the word “just” to include cases of 
“fraud, bad faith, or gross misconduct,” but not to be limited 
to that kind of malfeasance.  Id.  In other words, it appears 
that a candidate can proceed in good faith to seek a spot on 
the ballot and still be subjected to high litigation costs.  
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Whether that interpretation of § 2937 leaves the standard for 
cost shifting unconstitutionally vague and overbroad is yet 
open to debate.
19
   
What is not open to debate on the record before us, 
viewed in the plaintiff-friendly light that it must be, is that the 
award of costs in past cases has had a chilling effect on 
protected First Amendment activity.  Political actors have 
used the recent precedents from Pennsylvania courts as a 
cudgel against non-major parties and their candidates.  
According to the Aspiring Parties, Democrats and 
Republicans  – acting strategically, as one would expect of 
people in high-stakes political contests – have tried and will 
continue to try to block anyone from the ballot box who 
might strip votes from their favored candidates.  As quoted 
                                              
19
 To bolster its determination that future harm was too 
speculative, the District Court here also relied on the fact that, 
in the two cases where costs were imposed pursuant to 
§ 2937, “the Pennsylvania courts found that the candidates 
had participated in fraud, bad faith, or similar inappropriate 
conduct prior to assessing costs.”  Constitution Party, 2013 
WL 867183, at *7.  The Court went on to state that “[t]he 
Plaintiffs make no allegation a court will assess costs against 
a candidate who acted in good faith.”  Id.  That statement 
transforms the outcome in Farnese into the kind of bright-line 
standard (good faith on one side and bad faith on the other) 
that was expressly rejected by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court.  In re Farnese, 17 A.3d at 371.  The Aspiring Parties’ 
argument is not that, under Farnese, courts will start 
randomly ordering costs but that citizens do not know what 
conduct will lead to such orders.  It is the alleged uncertainty 
itself that leads to the Aspiring Parties’ injury. 
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earlier, a shrewd lawyer engaged on behalf of three private 
challengers affiliated with the Republican Party expressly 
threatened to move for upwards of $100,000 in costs if the 
Libertarian Party went forward with its nomination efforts.  
Referencing Rogers and Nader, the lawyer said, “[t]hese costs 
are comparable to the costs awarded in recent years by the 
Commonwealth Court in similar nomination paper 
challenges.”  (J.A at 87.)  The threat had the intended effect, 
and the Libertarian Party withdrew its 2010 nomination 
papers.  The Democratic Party similarly pushed the Green 
Party’s candidate out of the race for United States Senate in 
2010, when the Democratic candidate filed a challenge 
pursuant to § 2937.  The threat of cost shifting, entirely 
believable in light of recent history, chills the Aspiring 
Parties’ electioneering activities. 
 
That is the injury, and cogent precedent shows it to be 
intolerable.  In Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, the 
Supreme Court this term unanimously held that political 
advocacy groups had established injury-in-fact, in part 
because the threat of future prosecution, which was “bolstered 
by the fact that authority to file a complaint” was not limited 
to a government actor, could be used as a political tool.  
Susan B. Anthony List, 573 U.S., at __ (slip op., at 14).  The 
Court stated that, “[b]ecause the universe of potential 
complainants is not restricted to state officials who are 
constrained by explicit guidelines or ethical obligations, there 
is a real risk of complaint from, for example, political 
opponents.”  Id. (emphasis added). 20   
                                              
20
 Although the opinion in Susan B. Anthony List 
addressed a criminal statute, the Supreme Court said that it 
would “take the threatened [election] Commission 
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 In short, as we have already discussed, there are ample 
allegations of a present and continuing injury, despite the 
Commonwealth’s desire to minimize the problem as 
involving nothing more than “potential financial burdens.”  
(Appellees’ Br. at 39.)  It is quite true that a “chain of 
contingencies” amounting to “mere speculation” is 
insufficient for an injury-in-fact.  Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l 
USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013).  But the injury alleged by 
the Aspiring Parties is not a speculative series of conditions.  
Construed in the light most favorable to the Aspiring Parties, 
their Complaint establishes that, when they submit 
nomination papers as they must under § 2911(b), they face 
the prospect of cost-shifting sanctions, the very fact of which 
inherently burdens their electioneering activity.  See Susan B. 
Anthony List, 573 U.S., at __ (slip op., at 15-16) (noting the 
burden imposed on electoral speech, including “divert[ing] 
significant time and resources to hire legal counsel”).  They 
have produced sworn and uncontested declarations that their 
plans for seeking public office are directly impeded by the 
                                                                                                     
proceedings into account because administrative action, like 
arrest or prosecution, may give rise to harm sufficient to 
justify preenforcement review.”  573 U.S. __ (2014) (slip op., 
at 15).  The Court did not decide if such a threat, alone, gives 
rise to an injury-in-fact, because the Commission proceedings 
at issue in that case were “backed by the additional threat of 
criminal prosecution.”  Id.  The Pennsylvania statute, by 
contrast, does not provide for criminal sanctions; however, 
the Court’s analysis of threats used to stifle electoral activity 
informs us here.  
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relevant provisions of the election code.
21
  “Because 
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 Our dissenting colleague dismisses the Aspiring 
Parties’ efforts to have their day in court as founded solely on 
subjective fears.  (Dissent Op. at 1.).  For the reasons already 
outlined, we disagree with that characterization, as we do the 
dissent’s reliance on Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 
133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).  While our colleague is troubled by a 
supposed chain of contingencies (Dissent Op. at 3-4) – three 
links long – Clapper’s statement that injury must certainly be 
impending does not mean that Aspiring Party candidates must 
certainly be assessed costs.  (Id. at 4.)  It is enough that there 
is a reasonable evidentiary basis to conclude that the Aspiring 
Parties’ electioneering activity will be limited by 
Pennsylvania’s electoral scheme.  The credible threat of costs 
imposes the injurious restraint on political activity.   
Moreover, our colleague’s reliance on Clapper 
overlooks at least three ways in which that case is 
distinguishable.  First, Clapper addresses the unique realm of 
national security in which peculiar balance-of-power 
concerns, which are not present here, abound.  See Clapper, 
133 S. Ct. at 1147 (“[W]e have often found a lack of standing 
in cases in which the Judiciary has been requested to review 
actions of the political branches in the fields of intelligence 
gathering and foreign affairs.”).  Second, the Court’s holding 
that respondents did not have standing was based on a 
detailed review of the particular statutory scheme at issue in 
that case, which, by the Court’s count, included five levels of 
safeguards and contingencies.  See id. at 1148-50 (discussing 
the complex operation of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act as applied to the respondents).  Third, and 
most importantly, the law at issue in Clapper did not directly 
regulate the respondents.  Id. at 1148 (“[R]espondents’ theory 
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campaign planning decisions have to be made months, or 
even years, in advance of the election to be effective, the 
plaintiffs’ alleged injuries are actual and threatened.”  Miller 
v. Brown, 462 F.3d 312, 317-18 (4th Cir. 2006); see also New 
Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d 1495, 
1500–01 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding injury from the existence 
of a New Mexico statute relating to campaign expenditures 
that caused a congressman to engage in fundraising 
differently than he otherwise would have, even though the 
congressman had not yet announced his intention to run for 
                                                                                                     
necessarily rests on their assertion that the Government will 
target other individuals – namely, their foreign contacts.”).  
This third point alone makes Clapper inapposite and renders 
any language from it regarding subjective speculation or 
chains of contingencies inapplicable here.  The Supreme 
Court in fact relied on that very point to distinguish other 
standing cases from the facts of Clapper.  See id. at 1153.  
(“As an initial matter, none of these cases holds or even 
suggests that plaintiffs can establish standing simply by 
claiming that they experienced a ‘chilling effect’ that resulted 
from a governmental policy that does not regulate, constrain, 
or compel any action on their part.”); see also id. at 1150 
(“[R]espondents can only speculate as to whether their own 
communications … would be incidentally acquired.”).  In 
contrast, the Pennsylvania scheme compels the Aspiring 
Parties to file nomination papers and directly regulates their 
conduct in doing so.   
Finally, it bears repeating that, in this case, we are 
addressing a fundamental First Amendment right to political 
participation – not an inconvenience or burden, but wholesale 
disenfranchisement.  
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office).   
 
As those are the undisputed facts before us, the 
Aspiring Parties have established injury-in-fact.  We thus 
consider whether they also satisfy the other prerequisites for 
standing: causation and redressability.
 22
 
                                              
22
 To the extent that a separate declaratory judgment 
standing analysis is required, see Khodara Env’t, Inc. v. 
Blakey, 376 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2004) (separately 
reviewing “the standing requirements for a declaratory 
judgment case” and Article III standing) – something we have 
not expressly held but to which the Commonwealth devotes a 
great deal of space in its briefing – we reject the 
Commonwealth’s argument against such standing.  Although 
the Commonwealth contends that standing for declaratory 
judgment is an “extra layer to the analysis,” (Appellee’s Br. at 
31) we have often framed the inquiry as part of the injury-in-
fact analysis.  “A plaintiff seeking a declaratory judgment 
must possess constitutional standing but need not have 
suffered ‘the full harm expected.’” Khodara Env’t, Inc., 376 
F.3d at 193 (quoting St. Thomas–St. John Hotel & Tourism 
Ass’n v. V.I., 218 F.3d 232, 240 (3d Cir. 2000)).  Such a 
plaintiff “has Article III standing if ‘there is substantial 
controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of 
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a 
declaratory judgment.’”  Id. at 193-94 (quoting St. Thomas–
St. John Hotel & Tourism Ass’n, 218 F.3d at 240).  The 
Commonwealth claims that the interests of the parties are not 
adverse because Commonwealth officials only accept 
nomination papers for filing and have no role in any 
challenge posed to the papers.  Enforcement of the law can, 
however, establish an adverse interest.  See St. Thomas–St. 
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2. Causation 
 
The District Court held that, even if the Aspiring 
Parties could establish injury-in-fact, they had failed to 
establish causation.  Constitution Party, 2013 WL 867183, at 
*7-8.  A federal court may “act only to redress injury that 
fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, 
and not injury that results from the independent action of 
some third party not before the court.”  Simon v. E. Ky. 
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976).  The 
Commonwealth argues that, because private parties are the 
ones who bring lawsuits objecting to the nomination papers, 
the independent decisions of those objectors constitute a 
break in any actionable link to the Commonwealth’s conduct.  
Essentially, the argument is that Commonwealth officials 
only accept the nomination papers for filing, and they do none 
                                                                                                     
John Hotel & Tourism Ass’n, 218 F.3d at 240-41 (“The 
parties’ interests in this action could not be more adverse, as 
the government and employees, both defendants here, seek to 
enforce the protections provided by the [statute], and the 
employers … seek to avoid enforcement of those 
protections.”).  The Commonwealth also asserts that the 
controversy is not of “sufficient immediacy and reality” 
because the results of the 2012 nomination paper process 
depended on a “host of contingencies.”  (Appellee’s Br. at 
34.)  That argument fails for the same reasons discussed 
above regarding the immediate nature of the injury-in-fact.  
The Aspiring Parties satisfy the prerequisites to bring a 
declaratory judgment action.  Having said that, we reiterate 
that we are not deciding the merits and express no opinion on 
whether a declaratory judgment should ultimately issue.  
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of the things about which the Aspiring Parties complain.  We 
cannot agree with that self-serving characterization.   
 
Causation in the context of standing is not the same as 
proximate causation from tort law, and the Supreme Court 
has cautioned against “wrongly equat[ing] … injury ‘fairly 
traceable’ to the defendant with injury as to which the 
defendant’s actions are the very last step in the chain of 
causation.”  Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 168–69 (1997).  
Moreover, there is room for concurrent causation in the 
analysis of standing, Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 
F.3d 308, 316 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that if a petition 
witness residency requirement was “at least in part 
responsible for frustrating [plaintiff’s] attempt to fully assert 
his First Amendment rights in Virginia, the causation element 
of Lujan is satisfied”), and, indeed, “an indirect causal 
relationship will suffice, so long as there is a fairly traceable 
connection.”  Toll Bros. Inc., 555 F.3d at 142 (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).   There are two 
types of cases in which standing exists even though the direct 
source of injury is a third party:   
 
First, a federal court may find that a party has 
standing to challenge government action that 
permits or authorizes third-party conduct that 
would otherwise be illegal in the absence of the 
Government’s action.  Second, standing has 
been found where the record present[s] 
substantial evidence of a causal relationship 
between the government policy and the third-
party conduct, leaving little doubt as to 
causation and likelihood of redress.   
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Bloomberg L.P. v. CFTC, 949 F. Supp. 2d 91, 116 (D.D.C. 
2013) (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  At issue here is causation of the 
second type.  
 
The District Court concluded that the Aspiring Parties 
provided “nothing more than conjecture and conclusory 
assertions” to support their allegation that candidate 
recruitment problems stemmed from § 2937 costs.  
Constitution Party, 2013 WL 867183, at *8.  It also held that 
“any multitude of other factors” could have resulted in 
candidate reluctance.  Id.  Again, this largely ignores the 
Complaint and the declarations submitted with it.  To the 
extent that the Court addressed the Aspiring Parties 
allegations and proof, it certainly did not take them as true.  
Candidates and canvassers refuse to participate in the political 
process because, they have declared, they cannot bear the risk 
of litigation costs imposed under § 2937.  That is a direct and 
un-refuted statement of causation.  Because the “mere 
existence of the … law causes these [electoral] decisions to 
be made differently than they would absent the law … the 
standing inquiry’s second requirement of a causal connection 
between the plaintiffs’ injuries and the law they challenge” is 
satisfied.  Miller, 462 F.3d at 318 (citing Simon, 426 U.S. at 
41–42). 
 
The Commonwealth cannot hide behind the behavior 
of third parties when its officials are responsible for 
administering the election code that empowers those third 
parties to have the pernicious influence alleged in the 
Complaint.  To hold otherwise would mean that political 
bodies could never seek prospective relief because the 
objectors to their nomination papers will always be unknown 
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until it is too late to actually obtain a meaningful injunction.  
We cannot accept the Commonwealth’s argument that the 
only way to challenge the statutory scheme is in a lawsuit 
over a particular set of nominating papers.  Oral Arg. Tr. at 
47:12-25.  By the impossible logic of the Commonwealth, the 
Aspiring Parties will never have a prospective remedy for 
their injury, because there will never be standing, because 
there will never be causation, because the third parties who 
might challenge their nomination papers are always unknown 
until the opportunity for prospective relief has passed.
23
  Cf. 
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 
633 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The rule 
of law is ill served by forcing lawyers and judges to make 
arguments that deaden the soul of the law, which is logic and 
reason.”).  All the while, the C.G.L. Parties allege that they 
cannot advance from “political body” status precisely because 
they cannot recruit volunteers to even gather signatures.   
 
Under this specific statutory scheme, it is not the 
actions of other actors alone that cause the injury.  Those 
third parties could take no action without the mechanisms by 
which the Commonwealth’s officials oversee the election 
code provisions at issue here. Therefore, “the record 
present[s] substantial evidence of a causal relationship 
between the government policy and the third-party conduct, 
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 Some may say this goes too far and that the Aspiring 
Parties need not wait until a challenge is brought, but could 
come to court as soon as there are credible threats from third-
party challengers.  However, given the months and years of 
strategy that go into campaigning in our modern era, forcing 
political bodies to live under such uncertainty is, as already 
addressed above, subject to challenge.  
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leaving little doubt as to causation and likelihood of redress.”  
Bloomberg L.P., 949 F. Supp. 2d at 116 (alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
In fact, in reviewing other election challenges, it 
appears to be standard operating procedure for plaintiffs to 
bring these type of suits against the officials who administer 
the state election system, which here includes the Secretary of 
the Commonwealth and state election commissioners.  See 
Belitskus, 343 F.3d at 638 (finding standing where the 
defendants were the Secretary of the Commonwealth and the 
Commissioner for the Bureau of Commissions, Elections and 
Legislation).  For example, in American Party of Texas v. 
White, 415 U.S. 767, 770 (1974), plaintiffs brought claims 
“against the Texas Secretary of State seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief against the enforcement of various sections 
of the Texas Election Code,” and the Supreme Court 
undertook no standing analysis other than to note that other 
minor parties initially involved in the litigation lost standing 
during the proceedings,  id. at 770 n.2.  That the Supreme 
Court went straight to the merits of a similar ballot-access 
claim, brought for declaratory and injunctive relief against 
state officials charged with administering the election code, is 
not lost on us.  See id. at 780.  It implies the propriety of 
finding standing here, where the defendants exercise the same 
kinds of government authority.  The Aspiring Parties have 
established that their injury-in-fact can fairly be traced to the 
actions of the Commonwealth officials, and the causation 
element is satisfied.    
 
3. Redressability 
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Finally, standing requires that there be redressability, 
which is “a showing that ‘the injury will be redressed by a 
favorable decision.’”  Toll Bros. Inc., 555 F.3d at 142 
(quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. 
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000)).  The District Court 
did not address this requirement, Constitution Party, 2013 
WL 867183, at * 8, nor do the parties give it much 
consideration.  We agree that it does not need extensive 
attention.  Redressability here follows the rest of the standing 
analysis primarily because, by establishing causation, the 
Aspiring Parties have also established redressability.  See Toll 
Bros. Inc., 555 F.3d at 142 (finding that redressability is 
“closely related to traceability [causation], and the two prongs 
often overlap”).   If the Commonwealth officials do not 
enforce the election provisions at issue, then the Aspiring 
Parties will not be burdened by the nomination scheme 
embodied in §§ 2911(b) and 2937, allowing the C.G.L. 
Parties’ candidates to run for office and build functioning 
political parties.
24
  The Aspiring Parties have therefore 
alleged sufficient facts to establish standing.
25
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 We are not suggesting that framing a remedy, should 
that ever become necessary, would be a simple matter.  We 
are only holding that the redressability prong of a 
constitutional standing analysis is satisfied under the present 
circumstances. 
 
25
 The Aspiring Parties also contend that it was error 
for the District Court not to separately consider their § 2937 
facial challenge.  “Litigants asserting facial challenges 
involving overbreadth under the First Amendment have 
standing where ‘their own rights of free expression are [not] 
violated’ because ‘of a judicial prediction or assumption that 
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V. Conclusion 
 
While the merits of their claims must await a hearing 
on some future day, the Aspiring Parties have standing to 
pursue their claims and have them heard.  The order of the 
District Court dismissing the Complaint will be reversed. 
                                                                                                     
the statute’s very existence may cause others not before the 
court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or 
expression.’” McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 
238 (3d Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Broadrick 
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973)); Amato v. Wilentz, 
952 F.2d 742, 753 (3d Cir. 1991) (“The Supreme Court rather 
freely grants standing to raise overbreadth claims, on the 
ground that an overbroad ... regulation may chill the 
expression of others not before the court.”).  A separate 
analysis of the § 2937 facial claim and the statute’s impact on 
parties not before the Court is unnecessary at this juncture 
because we have determined that the Aspiring Parties have 
standing to bring all three claims in their Complaint. 
Lastly, the Commonwealth argues that the controversy 
was not ripe when it was filed.  The ripeness inquiry involves 
various considerations including whether there is a 
“sufficiently adversarial posture,” the facts are “sufficiently 
developed,” and a party is “genuinely aggrieved.”  Peachlum 
v. City of York, 333 F.3d 429, 433-34 (3d Cir. 2003).  
Although the District Court did not reach the question of 
ripeness, we hold that, for the reasons discussed above, the 
case was ripe for adjudication.   
The Constitution Party of Pennsylvania, et al.  
v. Carol Aichele, et al. 
No. 13-1952 
_________________________________________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, dissenting 
 Were the law on standing a blank slate, perhaps the 
plaintiffs
1
 here would have standing.  It is not, and they do 
not.  Instead, precedent establishes clear and exacting 
standards for when fear of a possible harm generates 
standing.  Because the plaintiffs have not met those standards, 
I respectfully dissent.  
 As the Supreme Court stated more than four decades 
ago, “[a]llegations of a subjective ‘chill’ are not an adequate 
substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a 
threat of specific future harm . . . .”  Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 
1, 13-14 (1972).  Here, the plaintiffs have specifically and 
with supporting declarations alleged that they and their 
members subjectively fear the future imposition of costs.  
Contrary to the majority’s position, our task is to determine 
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 As discussed in the majority opinion, it is difficult to select 
an appropriate short-hand label for the plaintiffs in this case, 
who include the Constitution Party of Pennsylvania, the 
Libertarian Party of Pennsylvania, and the Green Party of 
Pennsylvania, as well as several party officials and current or 
former candidates.  The majority’s preferred name, “Aspiring 
Parties,” seems fit only for the organizations (and even there 
it may be gratuitously laudatory).  Because the standing 
analysis in cases like this one focuses on the claims made by 
a party in its complaint and supporting documents, I have 
used the term “plaintiffs” rather than “appellants.”  
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whether that subjective fear has a sufficient objective basis to 
render it an injury sufficient to confer standing to sue today.  
 Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 133 S. Ct. 
1138 (2013), is particularly instructive in conducting this 
evaluation.  There a variety of lawyers and activist groups 
brought a constitutional challenge to expanded surveillance 
under an amended portion of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a, that they feared might 
intercept their communications given their work with targeted 
groups.  Id. at 1145.  The Second Circuit, reversing the 
District Court, found standing based on both what the 
plaintiffs termed an “objectively reasonable likelihood” of 
future interception and the actions of the plaintiffs based on 
fear of that interception.  Id. at 1146. 
 The Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court, ruling 
that the plaintiffs did not have standing.  The threat of future 
surveillance was too speculative to create standing because it 
“relie[d] on a highly attenuated chain of possibilities . . . .”  
Id. at 1148.  As to the applicable test, “the Second Circuit’s 
‘objectively reasonable likelihood’ standard is inconsistent 
with our requirement that ‘threatened injury must be certainly 
impending to constitute injury in fact.’” Id. at 1147 (emphasis 
added) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 
(1990)).  Instead, that “Circuit’s analysis improperly allowed 
respondents to establish standing by asserting that they suffer 
present costs and burdens that are based on a fear of 
surveillance, so long as that fear is not ‘fanciful, paranoid, or 
otherwise unreasonable.’”  Id. at 1151 (quoting Amnesty Int’l 
USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 134 (2d Cir. 2011)).  
 My majority colleagues make the same error, 
implicitly allowing the plaintiffs to establish standing without 
showing a sufficiently certain harm.  Their opinion states: 
“The threat of cost shifting, entirely believable in light of 
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recent history, chills the Aspiring Parties’ electioneering 
activities.”  Maj. Op. at 35 (emphasis added).  I do not doubt 
that the threat of cost shifting is “entirely believable,” id., nor, 
for the sake of argument, do I doubt that the plaintiffs in good 
faith believe costs would be assessed if the plaintiff 
organizations were to run candidates.  Yet this fear alone is 
simply not enough to create standing. 
 Instead, to generate standing, cost assessments must be 
“certainly impending.” They are not in at least three ways.  
First, assuming that a candidate were to collect and submit the 
necessary signatures (something the candidate is responsible 
for), someone would have to challenge his or her nomination 
papers.  Even if it is true that “[t]he likelihood of future legal 
challenges is hardly farfetched,” Maj. Op. at 27 n.15, a 
“hardly farfetched” threat is not enough.  The complaint 
alleges that in recent years some non-major party candidates 
have been challenged while others have not been challenged 
(in particular, the Libertarian Party nominees in 2008).  That 
some but not all recent candidates have been challenged does 
not support the inference that any particular nomination will 
inevitably be challenged in the future.  
 Second, if a nomination were challenged, the candidate 
would have to lose before costs could be imposed—i.e., his or 
her nomination papers would have to be disqualified.  Based 
on the complaint and supporting declarations, there is no 
basis for concluding that successful defenses against 
challenges are impossible or even improbable, particularly 
when (as the plaintiffs repeatedly assert) a candidate believes 
in good faith that he or she submitted sufficient valid 
signatures.  The mere fact of a challenge does not make 
disqualification a fait accompli. 
 Third, even if a challenge is successful, costs can be 
imposed under In re Farnese, 17 A.3d 357 (Pa. 2011), only if 
4 
 
a court deems such an assessment “just” after considering 
“the particular facts, the nature of the litigation, and other 
considerations as may appear relevant.”  Id. at 372.  A cost 
assessment is not automatic or inevitable after a challenge is 
lost, but rather is the subject of a case-specific balancing 
process by a neutral state court.  Although Clapper requires 
certainty, the majority inexplicably writes that it is post-
Farnese cost assessments’ “alleged uncertainty itself that 
leads to the Aspiring Parties’ injury.” Maj. Op. at 35 n.19 
(emphasis added).  Yet, as the majority notes, the provision 
allowing cost assessments has been law for over 75 years and 
the signature threshold has been unchanged for over 40 years.  
See id. at 12 (citing People’s Party v. Tucker, 347 F. Supp. 1, 
2 & n.2 (M.D. Pa. 1972)).  In all that time, the plaintiffs have 
identified just two instances in which a Pennsylvania court 
has assessed costs against a non-major party candidate under 
this provision, each involving particular facts that cause 
courts to “send a message” by way of a sanction.  The first 
major cost award involved widescale fraud, while the second 
involved repeated failure to comply with court orders.  These 
two cases, particularly in light of Farnese, do not support the 
conclusion that a candidate who is challenged and loses will 
inevitably be assessed costs.  What we have instead is, like 
Clapper, a “highly attenuated chain of possibilities [that] does 
not satisfy the requirement that threatened injury must be 
certainly impending.” Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1148. 
 Nor can the plaintiffs create standing by acting on their 
subjective fear.  Their filings are filled with language 
suggesting coercion, saying that would-be candidates have 
been “forced” or “compelled” to withdraw or not to run and 
referring to “threats” to seek costs by people associated with 
major parties.  The Clapper plaintiffs made analogous claims, 
such as “that the threat of surveillance sometimes compels 
them to avoid certain e-mail and phone conversations, to 
‘tal[k] in generalities rather than specifics,’ or to travel so that 
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they can have in-person conversations.”  Id. at 1151 
(alterations in original) (citations omitted).  The Supreme 
Court roundly rejected those contentions, writing that 
“respondents cannot manufacture standing merely by 
inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of 
hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.” Id.  
The same applies here: actions the plaintiffs or their 
“member-supporters” have taken or not taken out of fear of 
cost assessments do not create standing for the same reason 
that fear itself does not. 
 In response, my majority colleagues argue without 
citation that “[i]t is enough that there is a reasonable 
evidentiary basis to conclude that the [plaintiffs’] 
electioneering activity will be limited by Pennsylvania’s 
electoral scheme.”  Maj. Op. at 37 n.21.  In their view, so 
long as there is a “credible threat,” id., of some negative 
consequence for the exercise of one’s First Amendment right, 
a plaintiff can show standing by specifically alleging that he 
or she will not exercise the right out of subjective fear that 
consequence could occur.  This is not the law, and the 
majority’s purported bases for distinguishing Clapper, which 
amount to the conclusion that our case does not involve 
identical facts, are unavailing.  Thus I turn to what Clapper 
teaches.
2
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 I read the Supreme Court’s opinion in Susan B. Anthony List 
v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. ___ (2014), as simply an extension of 
the long-established special standing analysis in cases 
involving potential criminal prosecution for violating a 
prohibition on speech.  See id. (slip op. at 16) (“The 
burdensome Commission proceedings here are backed by the 
additional threat of criminal prosecution. We conclude that 
the combination of those two threats suffices to create an 
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 I know no basis for concluding that Clapper’s reach is 
limited to national security cases beyond the vague half-
sentence quoted by the majority. Clapper relies, with the 
exception of Laird, overwhelmingly on standing cases from 
outside the national security context.  For the central 
proposition that a threatened harm must be certainly 
impending, the Court relied on Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555 (1992), and a case where one death row inmate 
attempted to assert standing on behalf of another death row 
inmate, Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990).  See 
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 
n.2); id. (citing Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 158).  To conclude that 
costs incurred out of fear of a non-certain harm do not 
generate standing, the Court in Clapper looked to 
Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 (1976), a tax 
dispute among several states, and National Family Planning 
& Reproductive Health Association, Inc. v. Gonzales, 468 
F.3d 826 (D.C. Cir. 2006), a challenge to grant restrictions on 
family planning services.  See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1151. 
This range of sources strongly suggests that the Court meant 
for us to apply Clapper to standing decisions well beyond the 
narrow national security context. 
                                                                                                     
Article III injury under the circumstances of this case.”); see 
also, e.g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 
U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (“When contesting the constitutionality 
of a criminal statute, ‘it is not necessary that [the plaintiff] 
first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be 
entitled to challenge [the] statute that he claims deters the 
exercise of his constitutional rights.’” (alterations in original) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 
459 (1974))).  This case involves neither the threat of criminal 
prosecution nor a prohibition of any kind, and thus the 
Babbit-Steffel standing analysis does not apply.  
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 Moreover, in Clapper’s “detailed review of the 
particular statutory scheme at issue,” Maj. Op. at 38 n.21, the 
Court did not reach its conclusion based on some isolated, 
idiosyncratic feature of the FISA amendments.  It reviewed 
the statute to determine whether it made the purported harm 
certainly impending and concluded it did not.  See 133 S. Ct. 
at 1148-50.  A thorough review of the statutory scheme here 
reveals similar uncertainty and thus, I believe, leads to the 
same conclusion.  
 The majority also argues that Clapper does not apply 
because the plaintiffs there alleged that their First 
Amendment rights were burdened by possible surveillance of 
their contacts, see id. at 1148, while the plaintiffs here fear 
costs that might be assessed against them and their candidates 
directly. See Maj. Op. at 38 n.21.  It is a distinction without a 
difference.  That the Clapper plaintiffs feared government 
action against others rather than directly against themselves 
was simply one among many reasons the Court held that the 
harm to the plaintiffs from this hypothetical surveillance was 
too speculative to generate standing. See 133 S. Ct. at 1148.  
It was not, however, the basis of the Supreme Court’s 
conclusion, established in standing law since Laird, that a 
subjective chilling effect in general is insufficient for standing 
unless the feared harm is certainly impending.  See id. at 1152 
(quoting Laird, 408 U.S. at 13-14). This rule clearly still 
applies to the plaintiffs in our case. 
 The majority’s description of the statutory scheme as 
“not an inconvenience or burden, but wholesale 
disenfranchisement,” Maj. Op. at 38-39 n.21, hyperbolizes 
the law’s actual effects.  The plaintiffs themselves have 
repeatedly characterized the Pennsylvania laws’ collective 
effect as a “burden” on their constitutional rights but have not 
come close to alleging Pennsylvania “disenfranchises” them.  
See J.A. at 44 (“The application of Section 2911(b) and 
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Section 2937 has severely impacted Plaintiffs and continues 
to impose severe burdens on them.”); id. at 47 (“Section 
2911(b) and Section 2937, as applied, violate Plaintiffs’ 
freedoms of speech, petition, assembly, and association for 
political purposes, and their right to due process of law, as 
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, by 
imposing or threatening to impose substantial financial 
burdens on them . . . .”); id. at 49 (“The threat of incurring 
such financial burdens injures Plaintiffs.”). 
 “[T]he core component of standing is an essential and 
unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of 
Article III.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.  A subjective fear alone, 
no matter how deeply perceived, does not create a case or 
controversy the Constitution empowers us to hear unless that 
fear has a sufficient objective basis.  The majority believes 
that the plaintiffs—who have alleged only two instances ever 
of cost assessments against non-major-party candidates and 
speculate costs may be assessed again—have shown such a 
basis here.  I disagree because “hypothetical future harm that 
is not certainly impending” does not confer standing. 
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1143.  Thus I respectfully dissent. 
 
